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REGULATING RISK
BY "STRENGTHENING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE"
Paul Rose*
This essay, prepared for the "Regulating Risk" symposium of the
Connecticut Insurance Law Journal, reviews the connection between risk
and corporate governance, then examines the "Strengthening Corporate
Governance" provisions of Subtitle G of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank). The
corporate governance provisions, covering proxy access and the
separation of the roles of CEO and chairman of the board, seem likely to
have one of two possible effects. On the one hand, the provisions may be
pernicious, in that they further enhance shareholder power without a clear
justification for increased shareholder power, and more particularly
without a justification for shareholder power as a risk management device.
Indeed, Dodd-Frank's corporate governance provisions may work at cross-
purposes to the risk management intent of the remainder of Dodd-Frank:
the corporate governance provisions operate under the assumption that
enhanced shareholder power will result in better monitoring of managerial
behavior, which presumably will help to prevent future crisis, but both
theory and evidence suggest that diversified shareholders generally prefer
companies to take risks that other constituencies (including taxpayers)
would not prefer.
On the other hand, Dodd-Frank may have very little effect on investor
behavior or risk management. Increases in shareholder power over the
past years (fundamentally the result of increased federal regulation) have
made management more responsive to - and in some cases probably overly
responsive to - shareholder concerns over agency costs. Indeed, some of
the proposed reforms already have been or were likely to have been put in
place at most public companies. If private ordering is already working,
what is the point of imposing strict governance constructs across the
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market as a whole, especially when most of the affected firms are victims
of rather than contributors to, the Financial Crisis'
I. INTRODUCTION
Of the many explanations of the Financial Crisis of 2008, perhaps
the most pervasive is the linkage of the crisis to managerial greed: the crisis
as the result of managerial expropriation and excessive risk-taking
permitted by lax corporate governance and risk management. To assess the
characterization of the Financial Crisis as a governance crisis, we must test
the strength of the links between managerial behavior, corporate
governance and risk management. Certainly, in the run-up to the Financial
Crisis existing systems of governance and risk management failed to detect
and mitigate firm-level risks before they became systemic risks. Are these
failures of risk management ultimately corporate governance failures? If
they are, how do we address them?
Regulators and firms can (and do) attack governance problems
from multiple angles. Firms incentivize managers better by constructing
executive compensation schemes that closely link operating and/or stock
performance to compensation. Firms create monitoring systems that allow
managers and directors to recognize, evaluate, and mitigate risks to the
enterprise, and regulators create monitoring systems within regulatory
structures that allow them to recognize, evaluate, and mitigate systemic
risks created by a myriad of firm decisions. Regulators provide regulatory
support for a vigorous market for corporate control and impose, either
through new regulations or through existing corporate governance
mechanisms (such as proxy voting), governance structures that limit
managerial authority and/or increase managers' accountability to
shareholders.
This essay will focus on a specific effort of this last means of
managing agency costs-regulated governance arrangements-as a means
of managing both systemic and firm-specific risk. The essay will first
briefly consider the connection between risk management and corporate
governance, showing how the two are often linked. This link is implicitly
assumed by the recently passed Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (the "Dodd-Frank Act"). The second part of this
essay will consider the Dodd-Frank Act's assumptions concerning risk
management and shareholder power, and will argue that in the worst case
the Dodd-Frank Act exacerbates rather than mitigates risk, and in the best
case is merely a pointless exercise in political crisis management that will
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have no significant positive or negative effect on corporate governance or
risk management.
II. LINKING RISK MANAGEMENT AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
Risk management, broadly conceived, is an essential aspect of
good corporate governance, and vice versa. However we define corporate
governance (as a description of the relationship between corporate
stakeholders, as a set of rules or processes governing the corporate entity,
etc.), risk management works hand in hand with corporate governance as a
means of constraining agency costs and promoting efficient and prudent
management. Indeed, risk management so overlaps with corporate
governance that the terms may sometimes be used synonymously. Because
risk management practices in many financial firms failed during the
Financial Crisis, it has been said that corporate governance failed during
the Financial Crisis'-if this is true, the Financial Crisis is not a risk
management problem but a larger crisis in corporate governance. In this
essay I do not seek to dispute that corporate governance failures at some
firms contributed to the Financial Crisis. However, even if we assume that
this is the case, determining which aspects of corporate governance failed
is crucial: as Brian Cheffins has noted, important normative implications
flow from this determination.2 If the failure is in part due to incentive
compensation systems, should these systems be subject to additional
regulation, and if so, how should they be regulated? If the failure is also
due to failures of internal controls systems, should we rethink or enhance
the regulatory framework under Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley?
At the level of each specific firm, the precise nature of the failure
of governance and risk management is likely to be somewhat different.
Perhaps like Tolstoy's unhappy families, 3 each is unhappy in its own way
and failed for reasons that elude a simple narrative of greed or hubris. As
we continue to unravel the causes of the crisis, we do find some common
factors in the stories of financial firms like Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers,
' See Brian R. Cheffins, Did Corporate Governance "Fail" During the 2008
Stock Market Meltdown? The Case of the S&P 500, 65 Bus. LAW. 1, 2 (2009).
2 See Id. at 3.
See LEO TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA 1 (Richard Pevear & Larissa
Volokhonsky trans., Penguin Books Deluxe ed. 2002) (1877).
3
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AIG, and others. William Sahlman has aptly summed several common
factors:
In studying the financial crisis as it unfolded over the past
couple of years, it seems clear that many organizations
suffered from a lethal combination of powerful, sometimes
misguided incentives; inadequate control and risk
management systems; misleading accounting; and, low
quality human capital in terms of integrity and/or
competence, all wrapped in a culture that failed to provide
a sensible guide for managerial behavior. This assessment
refers to financial services firms like Countrywide, AIG
and Bear Steams: it also applies to other actors like
regulatory agencies, politicians, ratings agencies and
probably to individual consumers.
One of the financial firms that suffered from this "lethal combination,"
UBS, provided its shareholders with a frank assessment of its risk
management and governance failures. The 50-page report' provides a
helpful catalog of the numerous specific failures at UBS, the majority of
which almost certainly affected most other financial firms, including:
* Incomplete risk control methodologies.
* Insufficient challenge of the business case and governance
approach.
* Inappropriate risk metrics used in strategic planning and
assessment.
* Failure to own the business.9
4 William A. Sahlman, Management and the Financial Crisis (We have met
the enemy and he is us. ..) 4 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 10-033, 2009),
available at http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdfl 0-033.pdf.




7 Id. at 33.
Id. at 34.
9 Id. at 36.
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* Ex-post review versus pre-agreed limits [asking for forgiveness
rather than permission]. 0
* Failure to respond to wider industry concerns."
* Over-reliance on VaR.12
* Over-reliance on [debt] ratings.13
* Lack of recognition of idiosyncratic risk.14
* Asymmetric risk / reward compensation. 5
* Insufficient incentives to protect the UBS franchise long-
term.'6
With UBS, we indeed recognize powerful, sometimes misguided
incentives (in the form of trader and management compensation);17
inadequate control and risk management systems that could not adequately
evaluate and respond to risks; misleading accounting (UBS restated its
financials for 2008);18 and, low quality human capital in terms of integrity
and/or competence (lack of a willingness to challenge the bankers at UBS,
and a decline in the number of skilled risk managers).' 9
If UBS's risk management and governance problems were typical,
we might ask how better corporate governance at UBS could have
prevented the crisis. Arguably, management (including the board) should
'0 Id. at 37.
" UBS AG, supra note 5, at 37.
12 Id. at 38. A 2009 article by Joe Nocera contains two pithy quotes from two
famous VaR Skeptics:
David Einhom, who founded Greenlight Capital, a prominent
hedge fund, wrote not long ago that VaR was 'relatively useless
as a risk-management tool and potentially catastrophic when its
use creates a false sense of security among senior managers and
watchdogs. This is like an air bag that works all the time, except
when you have a car accident.' Nassim Nicholas Taleb, the best-
selling author of 'The Black Swan,' has crusaded against VaR
for more than a decade. He calls it, flatly, 'a fraud.'
Joe Nocera, Risk Management, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 4, 2009, at 24, 26-27.
' UBS AG, supra note 5, at 39.
14 id
" Id. at 42.
16 id
17 Sahlman, supra note 4, at 4.
'9 Id.
5
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have recognized the dangers in the subprime market and begun to de-lever
(debt to equity ratios were 30:1 at Lehman and Morgan Stanley).20 With the
benefit of hindsight, it seems that UBS's internal controls systems were not
adequate, that risk managers were using incomplete information and
incomplete models, and that UBS had a culture that was focused on short-
term profits and, in the words of the report, had "[i]nsufficient incentives to
protect the UBS franchise long-term." 2 1 But even with the risk management
systems then in place, one may ask why risk managers could not anticipate
the crisis. I suspect that many risk managers did, in fact, recognize the
problems in the housing and credit markets before the crisis, but obviously
did not anticipate the magnitude of the problem, nor appreciate the
interconnectedness of financial institutions. Some probably did express
their concerns to management, and perhaps their concerns were discounted.
A better question might be to ask why managers believed that they
could time the market so that they would be able to stop dancing just as the
music stopped playing, sure in the knowledge that risks would have been
passed along to someone else or adequately hedged, and that we would
make the fabled "soft landing" that Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke predicted
in February 2007.22 A partial answer to this question may be found in
behavioral explanations of the Financial Crisis, but a simple explanation
may also be found in the incentives of the managers. Citigroup, for
example, had to "keep dancing," as Chuck Prince put it, in order to stay
competitive with other banks. The low rates brought about by Fed policy
helped drive the leveraged buyout business; banks like Citi had "no
credibility to stop participating in this lending business . . . My belief then
and my belief now is that one firm in this business cannot unilaterally
withdraw from the business and maintain its ability to conduct business in
the future."2 He believed that "if you are not engaged in business, people
leave the institution, so it is impossible to say in my view to your bankers
we are just not going to participate in the business in the next year or so
20 Michael J. de la Merced, Vikas Bajaj & Andrew Ross Sorkin, As Goldman
and Morgan Shift, a Wall St. Era Ends, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Sept. 21, 2008,
9:35 PM), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/21/goldman-morgan-to-
become-bank-holding-companies/.2 1 UBS AG, supra note 5, at 42.
22 Edmund L. Andrews, Fed Chief Says Outlook Is Positive, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
15, 2007, at C10.
23 Cyrus Sanati, Prince Finally Explains His Dancing Comment, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (Apr. 8, 2010, 2:04 PM), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/
08/prince-finally-explains-his-dancing-comment/.
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until things become a little more rational. . . You can't do that and expect
to have any people left to conduct business in the future." 2 4
How, then, should we characterize the governance failures at UBS
and other financial firms, and how do they relate to risk management?
Certainly the control systems-and particularly the risk management
systems-failed, though perhaps not in every case due to a reckless
indifference to risk. As with the failure of Long Term Capital Management
over a decade ago, the state of the art in hedging and risk management
simply was not good enough, and a failure to respond to warning signs and
challenge existing models and business practices clearly contributed to the
collapse. Moreover, I believe that the incentive structures were also flawed
in that traders and originators had incentives to take on excessive risk
without internalizing the costs of that risk. Where appropriate limits are
placed on trading activities-a real back office check on the risk assumed
by the front office-a high-reward incentive structure is less problematic.
The problem comes when lax controls are combined with incentives to take
heavy risk.
Over both of these areas-risk management systems and incentive
schemes-management and the board must provide oversight. Generally,
they are obligated to ensure that systems are created and function
effectively in controlling (but not hobbling) the animal spirits that drive the
business forward. With this understanding, the governance structures at
most major financial institutions (excepting perhaps Goldman Sachs) can
be said to have failed from a risk management perspective.
Although my description of how risk management failures can be
described as failures of corporate governance may not offer the strongest
argument in support of the position, I believe that it is at least a reasonable
assessment of how the two failures may be linked. But importantly, even if
we recognize that the Financial Crisis was a risk management crisis, and
that as a risk management crisis it is in effect a corporate governance crisis,
we have still only introduced a problem, and have not justified any solution
to that problem. If we accept that poor corporate governance at least
contributed to the Financial Crisis, we must now turn to the question of
how corporate governance can be improved in order to better manage risk.
This question was recently addressed in the sweeping Dodd-Frank
legislation, in part through Subtitle G: "Strengthening Corporate
Governance." In the next section, I will focus on the assumptions
24 id
7
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underlying Subtitle G's corporate governance prescriptions, and on the
implications of the prescriptions for risk management.
III. REGULATING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TO MANAGE
RISK
In this section, I will first begin by describing the governance
provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act, then turn to an analysis of the
assumptions underlying the governance provisions. I will then discuss the
implications of the provision, focusing on how they are likely to affect risk
management.
A. "STRENGTHENING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE": SUBTITLE G
OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT
The first point of interest in the Dodd-Frank Act is its scope: Dodd-
Frank's corporate governance provisions are not limited to "too big to fail"
firms or financial services firms. They generally apply to any company
traded on a national stock exchange. The Dodd-Frank Act does not
explicitly preempt state law, but instead applies the SEC's power to
approve listing standards of the national stock exchanges.2 5 The Dodd-
Frank Act contains provisions that affect shareholder rights and that focus
on executive compensation. Although appropriate incentive compensation
is an important component of an overall corporate governance structure,
other papers in this symposium provide a detailed analysis of the
advisability of the compensation rules set out in the proposed regulations.
This essay will focus on the corporate governance aspects of the Dodd-
Frank Act that relate to shareholder rights.
The final version of Subtitle G of the Dodd-Frank Act contains two
major corporate governance provisions:27 1) explicit approval of an SEC
25 Richard J. Sandler, Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation in
the New Dodd Bill, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar.
17, 2010, 8:34 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/03/17/corporate-
governance-and-executive-compensation-in-the-new-dodd-bill/.
26 See id
27 Other sections of the Dodd-Frank Act not discussed in this paper also cover
important governance-related issues such as say-on-pay. This essay is limited to an
analysis of Subtitle G.
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proxy access rule;28 2) and a comply-or-ex lain provision on the separation
of the CEO and board chairman position. The Senate version of the bill
contained a majority-voting requirement, but this was eliminated in a
compromise with the House version of the bill.30 A provision in the 2009
Dodd Bill, absent in all versions of the 2010 bill, would have prohibited
classified boards unless approved or ratified by shareholders.3
1. Proxy Access
In a shift from the 2009 Dodd Bill, 32 the SEC "may" require proxy
access for shareholders, rather than requiring the SEC to issue proxy access
rules within 180 days of the Dodd-Frank Act's enactment. In response to
this authority, on August 25th, 2010, the SEC approved rules that provided
shareholders with the right to place director candidates on the corporate
ballot. To be able to nominate a director under this rule, a shareholder or
group of shareholders must hold 3% of the company's shares for more than
3 years.34
28 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173,
111th Cong. § 971 (2010) (enacted).
9 Id. § 972.
30 David S. Huntington, Summary of Dodd-Frank Financial Regulation
Legislation, HARv. L. SCH. F. ON CoRP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jul. 7, 2010,
9:15 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/07/07/summary-of-dodd-
frank-financial-regulation-legislation/. In the Senate version of The Dodd-Frank
Act, stock exchange listing requirements would have been required to include a
majority vote standard in uncontested director elections for all listed companies.
Plurality voting was permitted only in contested elections. A director receiving less
than a majority of votes cast would have been required to submit his or her
resignation. The board could have then refused the resignation, but the bill
required that it then publicly explain why it did not accept the director's
resignation. The majority voting requirement would not have been met by the
plurality-plus voting rules in place at many companies. Sandler, supra note 26.
31 Sandler, supra note 25.32 id.
33 H.R. 4173, § 972.
34 Lucian Bebchuck & Scott Hirst, Proxy Access Is In, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CoRP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Aug. 25, 2010, 11:20 AM),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/08/25/proxy-access-is-in/.
9
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2. CEO and Chairman Positions
The Dodd-Frank Act requires the SEC to promulgate rules
mandating proxy statement disclosure concerning the separation of the
CEO and chairman roles--companies must explain why the same or why
different persons serve in these roles. 3  Similar disclosure is already
required under the "Corporate Governance" disclosures mandated under
Item 407 of Regulation S-K. In particular, Item 407(h) requires companies
to "[b]riefly describe the leadership structure of the registrant's board, such
as whether the same person serves as both principal executive officer and
chairman of the board, or whether two individuals serve in those
positions...."3 If one person serves as both CEO and chairman of the
board, the company must "disclose whether the registrant has a lead
independent director and what specific role the lead independent director
plays in the leadership of the board." 37 The disclosure should also explain
"why the registrant has determined that its leadership structure is
appropriate given the specific characteristics or circumstances of the
registrant, and "disclose the extent of the board's role in the risk
oversight of the registrant, such as how the board administers its oversight
function, and the effect that this has on the board's leadership structure."39
B. ASSUMPTIONS OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT
The corporate governance provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act
suggest several tenuous assumptions about the role of corporate governance
in preventing financial crises. First, the inclusion of the provisions in the
Bill arguably assumes that the governance structures required by the
provisions could have helped prevent the Financial Crisis of 2008, or at
least limited its effects on compliant firms. More specifically, the Dodd-
Frank Act makes assumptions about the desirability of shareholder power
and the risk preferences of shareholders. Each of these assumptions has
tenuous support.
3s Huntington, supra note 30.
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1. Could the Provisions have Helped Prevent the
Financial Crisis?
There is plenty of blame to go around when one looks for causes of
and contributions to the Financial Crisis. The question as posed-could the
Dodd-Frank Act's provisions have helped to prevent the Financial
Crisis?-may be interpreted so broadly that it becomes unreasonable. I
doubt that anyone would argue that the whole of the blame for the
Financial Crisis rests on a few corporate governance practices that the
Dodd-Frank Act intends to cure. But even if we think of the question more
narrowly-that the "right" corporate governance practices could have
provided more warning, could have added accountability to corporate
governance, could have ensured more independent thinking by the board
that may have resulted in decisions that would have at least helped mitigate
some of the effects of the crisis-Dodd-Frank implicitly holds expectations
of the value of corporate governance. More precisely, the Dodd-Frank Act
assumes a need for mandatory, one-size-fits-all corporate governance
reform and shareholder empowerment.
As a preliminary matter, the evidence that corporate governance
matters for firm performance is uneven.4 0 Intuitively, this is primarily due
to the fact that "good" corporate governance is firm-specific and often
based on qualities, such as corporate culture, that are not readily
quantifiable and so are difficult or impossible to reduce to a set of metrics.
Determining causation in governance and performance is challenging, and
corporate governance research is replete with studies attempting to isolate a
particular metric (say, the separation of the CEO and chairman roles) to
determine whether the separation improves some measure of firm
performance. Much effort has recently gone into determining the accuracy
of the good governance metrics offered by governance ratings firms and
proxy advisors like RiskMetrics' ISS unit. We have some evidence that
some of the metrics used by ratings firms can meaningfully predict
40 Bebchuk, Cohen and Wang reason that the failure to find an association
between corporate governance and abnormal returns in the last decade is due to the
fact that investors have learned to appreciate the differences between good-
governance and poor-governance firms, and these differences have been factored
into market prices. Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Charles C. Y. Wang,
Learning and the Disappearing Association Between Governance and Returns
(unpublished discussion paper, no. 667), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract-1589731.
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performance, but at least some of these studies were commissioned by or
produced by the subject ratings firms.4 1 Other independent work suggests
that the ratings used by various firms do not accurately predict firm
performance.42 To underline an obvious but often disregarded point, proxy
advisory and corporate governance ratings firms are, after all, businesses.
They must have something of value to offer their clients, and they must
differentiate their products by price or by methodology. It would be
problematic for these firms if something basic-for example, share
ownership by independent directors, as Professors Bhagat, Bolton and
Romano's work suggests4 3 -is a more reliable predictor of firm
performance than their multitude of metrics. A simple, single metric could
be produced by the clients-institutional investors-relatively cheaply.
Instead, we have a profusion of proprietary rating systems, each constantly
tweaked and recalibrated-a process I call "methodology churn." No two
are alike, although the ratings are offered (at least by those firms that do not
engage in detailed analysis of the companies they rate by particular
governance issue) as though there were a single grand unified theory of
corporate governance, perfectly expressed by their proprietary
methodology. On this point, I note that Bebchuk, who is generally allied
with the governance ratings firms in the general goal of promoting
shareholder empowerment, has argued that governance ratings that try to
impose a great number of "good governance" metrics on firms are less
useful in predicting good governance than simply keying on a few
41 See, e.g., Lawrence D. Brown & Marcus L. Caylor, Corporate Governance
and Firm Performance (Dec. 7, 2004), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfh?abstract id=586423 (creating a measure of
corporate governance based on data from Institutional Shareholder Services).
42 See e.g., Sanjai Bhagat, Brian Bolton & Roberta Romano, The Promise and
Peril of Corporate Governance Indices (Eur. Corporate Governance Inst., Working
Paper No. 89, 2007), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfi?
abstract _id= 1019921; Robert Daines, Ian D. Gow & David F. Larcker, Rating the
Ratings: How Good are Commercial Governance Ratings? (Arthur and Toni
Rembe Rock Ctr. For Corporate Governance, Working Paper No. 360, 2009),
available at http://law.stanford.edu/display/images/dynamic/publicationspdf/
dgl6-26-2008_1.pdf (finding that there is no consistent relation between
government indices and measures of corporate performance).
43 Sanjai Bhagat, Brian Bolton & Roberta Romano, The Promise and Peril of
Corporate Governance Indices.
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problematic entrenchment devices such as poison pills"-in other words, it
seems easier to spot "bad governance" structures than it is to effectively
prescribe "good governance" structures.
The problems with the corporate governance industry metrics are
instructive with respect to the particular provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act.
As we inch closer towards a federally-mandated, one-size-fits-all corporate
governance framework, companies, investors and regulators may begin to
treat corporate governance and particular governance structures as an end
rather than as means. Should we be surprised then, as ISS must have been,
when a technically, superficially well-governed company like Enron turns
out to be a whited sepulcher? Little faith should be placed in the risk
management utility of mandatory "good governance" structures, and the
Dodd-Frank Act provisions require practices and structures which, as will
be discussed below, have uncertain governance value and potentially
serious governance disadvantages.
2. Shareholder Power and the Risk Preferences of
Shareholders
Cheffins has noted that "given the zeitgeist, it is doubtful whether
any set of corporate governance arrangements could have forestalled the
financial bandwagon on the loose in the mid-2000s. Amidst an implicit
consensus among investors, politicians, regulators, journalists and even
homebuyers that an overheating financial system was fundamentally sound,
those preaching caution were marginalized.'" 5 The irony of the Dodd-
Frank Act is that things may have been worse if the Act were in place prior
to the Financial Crisis. Indeed, it is when we analyze the Act's
assumptions about shareholder power and shareholder risk preferences that
we recognize that investors were among those encouraging the banks to
keep dancing.
Because shareholders, the residual claimants of the corporation, are
diversified across markets and often across asset classes, they will often
push management to swing for the fences. The Dodd-Frank Act assumes
that shareholders are primarily interested in long-term value creation, but
this assumption does not square with the behavior of many investors.
Shareholders may have different risk preferences and attempt to influence
4 See Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, What Matters in
Corporate Governance, 22 REv. FIN. STuD, 783, 787 (2009).
45 Cheffins, supra note 1, at 38.
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managers to make decisions in line with those preferences. As outlined by
the Aspen Institute's statement on "Overcoming Short-Termism,"46 signed
by John Bogle, Warren Buffett and others, the influence of money
managers, mutual funds and hedge funds "who focus on short-term stock
price performance, and/or favor high-leverage and high-risk corporate
strategies designed to produce high short-term returns"'47 present several
problems. First, many such investors' preferences work not only against
other long-term-focused shareholders but against their ultimate investors'
interests because high rates of portfolio turnover through frequent trading
can significantly erode gains.4 8 Second, fund managers focused on short-
term trading gains "have little reason to care about long-term corporate
performance or externalities, and so are unlikely to exercise a positive role
in promoting corporate policies, including appropriate proxy voting and
corporate governance policies, that are beneficial and sustainable in the
long-term."49 Also, managers and board members may harm the interests of
shareholders seeking long-term growth and sustainable earnings by
pursuing strategies designed to satisfy short-term investors; "This, in turn,
may put a corporation's future at risk."50
Deeper shareholder involvement in corporate governance, as
encouraged by the Dodd-Frank Act's corporate governance provisions, is
designed to encourage more vigilant monitoring of managers and more
prudent risk management. However, the UK experience suggests that this is
unlikely to be the case. As Cheffins notes:
U.K. company law is, in various respects, more
"shareholder-friendly" than the equivalent regime in the
U.S., as U.K. shareholders have greater scope to call
shareholder meetings, initiate changes to the corporate
constitution and dismiss directors. . . . Regardless, it does
not appear that banks were better managed in the U.K. than
in the U.S. Moreover, bank shareholders apparently made
46 THE ASPEN INST., OVERCOMING SHORT-TERMISM: A CALL FOR A MORE
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little use of the powers available to them. The chief
executive of the U.K.'s financial markets regulator
admonished major shareholders for being "too reliant and
unchallenging" in the run up to Financial Crisis. Lord
Myners, Financial Services Secretary in the U.K. Treasury,
similarly chastised institutional shareholders as being
"absentee landlords". The experience in Britain implies
that even if shareholder rights are increased in the U.S. in
the aftermath of the stock meltdown of 2008, there is no
guarantee shareholders will use the powers made available
to them to forestall a similar future assault on shareholder
value.
David Walker, commissioned by the Prime Minister to review UK banks'
corporate governance in the wake of the Financial Crisis, makes a similar
observation, and suggests that in some cases shareholder were complicit in
excessive risk-taking:
Before the current crisis broke there appears to have been a
widespread acquiescence by institutional investors and the
market in the gearing up of banks' balance sheets as a
means of boosting returns on equity. This was not
necessarily irrational from the standpoint of the immediate
interests of shareholders who, in the leveraged limited
liability business of a bank, receive all of the potential
upside whereas their downside is limited to their equity
stake, however much the bank loses overall in a
catastrophe. The atmosphere of at least acquiescence in
high leverage on the part of shareholders will have
exacerbated critical problems encountered in some
instances. And, while institutional investors could not have
prevented the crisis, even major fund managers appear to
have been slow to act where issues of concern were
identified in banks in which they were investors, and of
limited effectiveness in seeking to address them either
individually or collaboratively. The limited institutional
efforts at engagement with several UK banks appear to
have had little impact in restraining management before the
51 Cheffins, supra note 1, at 45-46.
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recent crisis phase, and it is noteworthy that levels of
voting against bank resolutions rarely exceeded 10 per
cent.52
Viewed in this light, shareholder power may not only fail to
remedy risk management problems but also exacerbate them. If we view
the Financial Crisis as a governance problem, it is not clear that the crisis is
attributable to expropriation of principals' interests by management
shareholders. Nestor Advisors, a corporate governance consultancy, argues
that management does not seem to have short-changed shareholders in the
Financial Crisis. Executives' financial interests were aligned with
shareholders' interests. But in the case of banks, especially, this can be
problematic: "Regulators, like everyone else, seem to have forgotten that,
when it comes to firms that are by definition highly geared due to their
maturity transformation function, full alignment with shareholder interest
might be the riskiest of all alignments."
At least from the point of view of banks, the shareholder
empowerment envisioned by the corporate governance section of the Dodd-
Frank Act thus may work at cross-purposes to the risk management
purposes of the remainder of the Dodd-Frank Act. But even with non-
financial companies, there is little evidence to support the notion that
enhanced shareholder power as encouraged by the Dodd-Frank Act will
improve the risk management function of corporate governance. Indeed, to
the extent that influential shareholders encourage risk-taking by managers,
the long-term interests of the corporation may suffer.
As a final note, consider the performance of Goldman Sachs in the
Financial Crisis.54 Because of a strong firm culture, Goldman's
management was arguably the best-insulated from influential shareholder
pressure; arguably, their relative success in navigating the crisis lies in the
fact that Goldman treated risk management as though it were still a
52 DAVID WALKER, A REVIEW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN UK BANKS
AND OTHER FINANCIAL INDUSTRY ENTITIES § 5.9 (2009), available at
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/walkerreviewconsultation_160709.pdf; see
generally id. § 5 (discussing engagement, stewardship, collective action and
governance).
53 NESTOR ADVISORS, GOVERNANCE IN CRISIS: A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY
OF SIX US INVESTMENT BANKS 17 (2009), available at
http://www.nestoradvisors.co.uk/fileadmin/user upload/articles/USBankO9.pdf.
54 For a discussion of Goldman in the Financial Crisis, see Nocera, supra note
12; Sahlman, supra note 4.
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partnership-with partners internalizing losses as well as gains-rather
than a corporation influenced by the short-term interests of certain
investors.
3. The Act's Provisions: Pernicious or Merely Pointless?
Given the potential higher appetite for risk associated with
increased shareholder power, the Dodd-Frank Act's corporate governance
provisions seem to provide little enhancement to risk management. The
corporate governance provisions are better understood as not directed
towards the causes of the Financial Crisis, but rather as simply not letting a
crisis go to wastess-packaging corporate governance reforms that have
been long-sought by powerful Democratic constituencies with a bill that
should be directed solely towards systemic risk management. More to the
point, the corporate governance provisions would not be good legislation
even if they stood alone, unconnected to the questions of risk management
raised by the Financial Crisis. In the aggregate, the Dodd-Frank Act's
corporate governance provisions are likely to have pernicious 6 effects.
Hopefully they will be merely pointless.
5 See Jeff Zeleny & Jackie Calmes, Obama, Assembling Team, Turns to the
Economy, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2008 at Al.
56 In my symposium remarks, I noted the possibility that the Dodd-Frank Act
could have pernicious effects on corporate governance, but I was not the only one
to characterize the provisions in this way. See also Steven M. Bainbridge, The
Fruits of Shareholder Activism, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (June 3, 2010, 11:25
AM), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/wall-street-
reform/ (Steven Bainbridge provides an excellent analysis of the pernicious
corporate governance provisions of Dodd-Frank).
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a) The Potentially Pernicious Effects of the
Dodd-Frank Act 7
Proxy access has generated the most controversy of the two
adopted provisions, having been the subject of several proposed SEC rules
that generated thousands of comments. Like majority voting, proxy access
is touted by its proponents as a step towards more democratic governance
of the public corporation (notwithstanding the questionable value of
democracy as applied to the corporate form18). However, empirical work on
proxy access suggests that it is more likely to harm than help corporate
governance. Grundfest, reviewing recent studies on stock price response to
the SEC's earlier proxy access proposals, states that:
The best currently available empirical data thus indicate
that, given a choice between the current regime and the
Commission's proposed proxy access rules, shareholders
seeking to maximize returns would prefer the status quo
because the proposed rules appear to destroy shareholder
wealth. Moreover, if there is to be a proxy access rule, the
cross-sectional variation in the data suggest that an opt-in
regime, in which shareholders define for themselves the
rules governing proxy access on a corporation-by-
5 As indicated above, the majority voting standard was eliminated from the
final version of the Act. This is just as well, because majority voting has been
enacted at many public companies already, largely as a result of consistent pressure
from institutional investors and the corporate governance industry in the past
decade. See William K. Sjostrom & Young Sang Kim, Majority Voting for the
Election of Directors, 40 CONN. L. REv. 459, 462 (2007). A recent study of the
governance practices of the largest U.S. companies, conducted by Shearman and
Sterling LLP, showed that 82 out of the top 100 companies had implemented some
form of majority voting in director elections. SHEARMAN & STERLING,
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF THE LARGEST US PUBLIC COMPANIES 4 (2010). As
most of the larger public companies have enacted majority voting provisions, the
mandatory imposition of majority voting provisions would have affected smaller
public companies most directly. For a summary of the arguments against a
majority voting standard, see Sjostrom & Kim, supra, at 469.
58 For an extended argument on the merits of democracy in business entities,
see DINO FALASCHETrI, DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE: How ACCOUNTABILITY CAN Go Too FAR IN LAW, POLITICS, AND
BUSINESS (2009).
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corporation basis, is likely preferable to an opt-out regime,
in which the Commission has to guess at an optimal
default rule, and where the data indicate that the
Commission's current best guess destroys a statistically
significant amount of shareholder wealth. 9
Why would at least some shareholders be concerned with greater
shareholder power? Because larger shareholders with proxy access may
use the threat of a proxy fight to extract private benefits from a
corporation-perhaps merely by using the proxy as a megaphone for the
shareholder's causes (imposing what Grundfest calls "megaphone
externalities") 6 0-or simply to pursue idiosyncratic corporate governance
changes that the shareholder (but not management or the majority of the
other shareholders) believes are necessary.
Buckberg and Macey provide several arguments against proxy
access in a report accompanying the Business Roundtable's comments on
the SEC's 2009 proxy access proposal.6' They find that proxy access is
unnecessary given numerous effective mechanisms to discipline
management, that proxy contests under the pre-Dodd-Frank rules were not
prohibitively expensive, and that the SEC's proposed rules would
inefficiently allocate benefits and costs of proxy contests and would not
distinguish between the issues associated with expressing disapproval of an
incumbent director and the issues associated with identifying, nominating,
legitimating, and electing an outside insurgent director, among other
reasons. They also argue that an increase in proxy-related costs is a
predictable and inevitable result of proxy access:
59 Joseph A. Grundfest, Measurement Issues in the Proxy Access Debate 3-4
(Rock Ctr. For Corp. Governance, Working Paper Series No. 71, Stan. Univ. L.
Sch. L. and Econ. Olin, Working Paper Series No. 392, 2010), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-1538630.
6o Joseph A. Grundfest, The SEC's Proposed Proxy Access Rules: Politics,
Economics, and the Law 4 (Rock Ctr. For Corp. Governance, Working Paper
Series No. 64, Stan. Univ. L. Sch. L. & Econ. Olin, Working Paper Series No. 386,
2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract--1491670.
61 See ELAINE BUCKBERG & JONATHAN MACEY, REPORT ON EFFECTS OF
PROPOSED SEC RULE 14A-11 ON EFFICIENCY, COMPETITIVENESS AND CAPITAL
FORMATION IN SUPPORT OF COMMENTS BY BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE (2009) (stating
that risks of the SEC's proposal include less qualified boards of directors, board
members whose interests diverge from maximizing shareholder value, a
disincentive to go public, and increasing the cost of capital for U.S. companies).
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It is a well-known result in economic theory that when the
marginal social cost of an activity exceeds its marginal
private cost, as is the case with any subsidy, more of that
activity will take place. In the case of the proposed SEC
rule, the marginal social cost of a shareholder nominating a
director is higher than the marginal private cost because
the costs of the contested election are borne in part by the
issuer, rather than the nominating shareholder. This
subsidy will inevitably increase the number of director
nominations by shareholders.6 2
Lowering the cost of proxy access leads to a pernicious result,
particularly when the right of access is conditioned upon a relatively low
level of shareholder ownership: proxy rules give influence to investors with
less to lose from the poor performance of the company and more to gain
through private benefits. Even if the dissident shareholders are interested
in wealth maximization for all shareholders, Buckberg and Macey present
evidence that companies with dissident board members significantly
underperform peer companies without dissident directors.
Dodd-Frank's other Subtitle G corporate governance provision, a
comply-or-explain provision that would require disclosure on the CEO and
chairman of the board of directors (COB) positions, may also have
pernicious effects. The policy justification for splitting the two roles is
thin. Oded, Palmon and Wald argue that while a management structure in
which two executives hold the CEO and COB may facilitate checks and
balances and thus may mitigate management agency costs, a management
structure in which one person holds both positions provides a clearer set of
directives for the companies and facilitates better communication between
boards and management. Results from the UK also show that splitting the
roles does not appear to produce positive effects. In a recent study, Dahya,
Garcia and van Bommel reviewed the performance of publicly listed U.K.
companies over a period covering the issuance of the Cadbury Committee's
Code of Best Practice, which advocated splitting the CEO/COB positions.6
0'Id. at 8.
63Oded Palmon & John K. Wald, Are Two Heads Better than One: The Impact
of Changes in Management Structure on Performance by Firm Size, 8 J. CORP.
FIN. 213, 214 (2002).
6 Jay Dahya, Laura Galguera Garcia & Jos van Bommel, One Man Two Hats:
What's All the Commotion!, 44 FiN. REV. 179 (2009).
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They found that companies splitting the combined CEO/COB position did
not exhibit any absolute or relative improvement in performance when
compared to various peer-group benchmarks.6 5 These findings are
supported by a study by Dey, Engel and Liu. They examined the effects
of US firms that had split the CEO/COB position and ones that had not, and
noted that there was no significant difference in either the accounting or
market return performance. In fact, when firms had a powerful CEO,
strong information flows and strong governance, in addition to a combined
CEO/COB position, returns were significantly higher than both combined
CEO/COB firms without these traits and firms with separate roles for their
CEO and COB. They conclude that regulators should be wary about
implementing a one-size-fits-all requirement for this position, as some
firms appear to benefit from the combined arrangement.
This section has addressed the potentially pernicious effects of the
Dodd-Frank Act as stand-alone provisions, but there is also a general
concern over what Bainbridge calls the "creeping federalization" of
corporate law. Bainbridge argues that:
[T]he uniformity imposed by [the Dodd-Frank Act] will
preclude experimentation with differing modes of
regulation. As such, there will be no opportunity for new
and better regulatory ideas to be developed-no
"laboratory" of federalism. Instead, we will be stuck with
rules that may well be wrong from the outset and, in any
case, may quickly become obsolete.67
With respect to corporate governance, the Dodd-Frank Act's one-
size-fits-all governance structures will not reduce either company or
systemic risks, and instead will incrementally reduce the flexibility and
value of state regulation of public corporation governance. Ribstein notes
the irony of establishing a rule that supposedly empowers shareholders, yet
65 id
66 Aiyesha Dey, Ellen Engel, Xiaohui Gloria Liu, Determinants and
Implications ofBoard Leadership Structure, UNI. CHI BOOTH SCH. Bus RES. PAP.,
(Jun. 2009).
67 Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Pernicious Corporate Governance
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at the same time eliminates their ability to choose something other than a
federally-mandated proxy structure:
The real problem is that the SEC has barred any possibility
for the shareholders or state law to provide for less proxy
access than under the new rule. How can a rule that bars
shareholders from making certain types of governance
rules, either directly or by choosing the state of
incorporation, increase shareholder participation in
governance?
Perhaps the answer is that shareholders shouldn't
participate in governance because they are too easily
manipulated and misled and simply don't know what's
good for them. Rather, the SEC knows best. . . . Consider
the most obvious anomalies: If the shareholders can't be
trusted to decrease proxy access, why should they be
trusted to increase it? If we fear that managers, even with
the new proxy rule, can still manipulate shareholders, then
why trust the shareholders to do anything? And if the
shareholders can't be trusted, why should the securities
laws force firms, at great cost, to inform shareholders so
they can participate in the proxy process? In other words,
the rule is fundamentally inconsistent with the whole point
of the securities laws to provide the disclosure necessary to
enable the shareholder to be effective governors of their
firms. 68
b) The Pointlessness of the Dodd-Frank Act's
Corporate Governance Provisions
Even if one assumes that the Dodd-Frank Act's corporate
governance provisions are good policy, given recent trends in state law and
the private ordering of corporate governance, the provisions appear to be
pointless, rather than pernicious; reminiscent of Cunningham's memorable
Larry Ribstein, The SEC vs. shareholders, TRUTH ON THE MARKET
(Aug. 30, 2010, 9:15 AM), http://truthonthemarket.com/2010/08/30/the-sec-vs-
shareholders/.
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characterization of the Sarbanes-Oxley "yawn," 69 the Dodd-Frank Act
might also represent more rhetoric than reform. While the corporate
governance provisions are unlikely to produce any significant benefits (and
many would argue that Sarbanes-Oxley did not either), the direct costs will
certainly be less significant than Sarbanes-Oxley's. Dodd-Frank's
provisions may simply not have much of an effect on corporate
governance.
In the case of proxy access, shareholders in the most important
corporate jurisdiction, Delaware, had the ability prior to the enactment of
Dodd-Frank to select shareholder proxy for their firms. Delaware General
Corporation Law section 112 provides that "[t]he bylaws may provide that
if the corporation solicits proxies with respect to an election of directors, it
may be required, to the extent and subject to such procedures or conditions
as may be provided in the bylaws, to include in its proxy solicitation
materials (including any form of proxy it distributes), in addition to
individuals nominated by the board of directors, I or more individuals
nominated by a stockholder. At least in Delaware, private ordering was
already possible, making the Dodd-Frank proxy provisions pointless unless
it is the case that shareholders are impeded from exercising their right to
nominate shareholders under the DGCL. In the adopting release for the
proxy access rules, however, the SEC argued that:
corporate governance is not merely a matter of private
ordering. Rights, including shareholder rights, are artifacts
of law, and in the realm of corporate governance some
rights cannot be bargained away but rather are imposed by
statute. There is nothing novel about mandated limitations
on private ordering in corporate governance.
The SEC then argued that private ordering is less desirable
because a "company-by-company shareholder vote on the applicability of
Rule 14a- ll would involve substantial direct and indirect, market-wide
costs." A compromise solution-the ability for companies to opt out of
the proxy access rules-was rejected because "management can draw on
the full resources of the corporation to promote the adoption of an opt-
out, while disaggregated shareholders have no similarly effective
platform from which to advocate against an opt-out." Finally, even where
69 Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric,
Light Reform (And it Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915 (2003).
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proxy rights are granted pursuant to a provision like DGCL sec. 112, the
SEC noted that "the board of directors is ordinarily free, subject to its
fiduciary duties, to amend or repeal any shareholder-adopted bylaw."
Although I do not believe these arguments carry the burden of
proof that would justify such important mandatory governance changes,
especially given the pernicious effects outlined by Buckberg and Macey,
the importance of this change may prove to be less significant than the
arguments against proxy access have suggested. Some hope that this may
be the case comes from the Canadian experience with proxy access.
Although proxy access is available to investors in Canadian firms, that
access is rarely used.70 The reason, a Canadian lawyer suggests, is that
using the corporation's proxy would put the shareholder activist at "a
tactical disadvantage."n If activists use the corporate proxy, they would
be limited to the restrictions of the corporate proxy (presumably
including word limitations). Effectively, activists tend to view the ability
to control the message as worth the costs of a proxy solicitation. The
hope that investors will only use proxy access as a means of reducing
managerial agency costs is dampened by the likelihood that even if
shareholders rarely use proxy access in the U.S, activists may credibly
use the threat of proxy access as a lever with corporations to extract
private benefits. One means of neutralizing this threat is to make clearer
to other shareholders the effects of this leverage. Exposing this leverage,
by requiring enhanced disclosures of shareholder involvement in
corporate governance matters, may help prevent some of the harmful
72
aspects of proxy access predicted by its detractors.
The provision on the separation of the CEO and chairman roles
seems much less likely than proxy access to have an impact on governance
since it has already been enacted in principle. Perhaps like the proxy
access provision, the CEO-Chairman disclosure provision was included
simply to provide legislative protection for the SEC's rulemaking efforts.
Even if this were a new rule, however, it would likely not have a significant
70 Lisa Fairfax, Some Canadian Perspective on Proxy Access, THE
CONGLOMERATE (Mar. 9, 2010, 1:03 PM), http://www.theconglomerate.org/
2010/03/some-canadian-perspective-on-proxy-access.html.
71 id.
72 For a discussion of the effects of shareholder influence and a proposal of
possible disclosure rules that would address the enhanced shareholder influence
created by the Dodd-Frank Act, see Paul Rose, Common Agency and the Public
Corporation, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1355.
7 Dahya, Galguera, Garcia & van Bommel, supra note 64, at 180.
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effect. In some cases, comply-or-explain sorts of provisions tend to have
the effect of mandatory governance rules because of the costs of non-
compliance (either through burdensome disclosures or because of the
shaming aspect intended by the disclosure). This may be the case, for
example, with the disclosure of a code of ethics required under Section 406
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. In the case of the separation of the CEO and
chairman roles, however, combining the two roles is not intuitively
inappropriate; on the other hand, shareholders might reasonably wonder
why a company would not have a code of ethics.
III. CONCLUSION
This essay has briefly reviewed the connection between risk and
corporate governance and the specific corporate governance provisions of
the Dodd-Frank Act. The corporate governance provisions, covering
majority voting for director elections, proxy access, and the separation of
the roles of CEO and chairman of the board, seem likely to have one of two
possible effects. On the one hand, the provisions may be pernicious-and
the proxy access rules seem very likely to fall into this category-in that
they further enhance shareholder power without a clear justification for
enhanced shareholder power, but more particularly without a justification
for shareholder power as a risk management device. Indeed, the Dodd-
Frank Act's corporate governance provisions may work at cross-purposes
to the risk management intent of the remainder of the Dodd-Frank Act: the
corporate governance provisions operate under the assumption that
enhanced shareholder power will result in better monitoring of managerial
behavior, which presumably will help to prevent future crisis, but both
theory and evidence suggest that diversified shareholders generally prefer
companies to take risks that other constituencies (including taxpayers)
would not prefer. Empowering shareholders further will not change the
nature of the shareholders' interest in risk-taking since they are limited in
their downside risk; if influential shareholders focus on long-term rather
than short-term gains, it will be because of market forces, not because they
have been empowered by the Dodd-Frank Act.
On the other hand, the Dodd-Frank Act may have very little effect
on investor behavior or risk management. This is probably the case for the
CEO/COB split provision. Increases in shareholder power over the past
years (fundamentally the result of increased federal regulation) have made
management responsive-and in some cases probably overly responsive
to-shareholder concerns over agency costs. If private ordering is already
working, what is the point of imposing strict governance constructs across
25
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the market as a whole, especially when most of the affected firms are
victims of, rather than contributors to, the Financial Crisis?
